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Abstract
Despite the vulnerability of object detectors to adversarial attacks, very few de-
fenses are known to date. While adversarial training can improve the empirical
robustness of image classifiers, a direct extension to object detection is very ex-
pensive. This work is motivated by recent progress on certified classification by
randomized smoothing. We start by presenting a reduction from object detection to
a regression problem. Then, to enable certified regression, where standard mean
smoothing fails, we propose median smoothing, which is of independent interest.
We obtain the first model-agnostic, training-free, and certified defense for object
detection against `2-bounded attacks.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are seemingly innocuous neural network inputs that have been deliberately
modified to produce unexpected or malicious outputs. Early work on adversarial examples was highly
focused on image classifiers, which assign a single label to an entire image [8, 5, 20, 6]. A large
literature has rapidly emerged on defenses against classifier attacks, which includes both heuristic
defenses [18] and certified methods with theoretical guarantees of robustness [7, 29, 1, 19, 21].
However, most realistic vision systems crucially rely on object detectors, rather than image classifiers,
to identify and localize multiple objects within an image [23, 22, 16].
Over time, attacks on object detection have become more sophisticated, as has been successfully
demonstrated both digitally and in the physical world using a range of perturbation techniques, as
well as attacks that break both the object localization and classification parts of the detection pipeline
[17, 26, 30, 10, 14]. At the same time, we are not aware of any paper studying defenses for detectors.
This lack of defenses is likely because (i) the complexity of the multi-stage detection pipeline [23] is
difficult to analyze, and (ii) detectors are far more expensive to train than classifiers. Furthermore,
(iii) object detectors output bounding-box coordinates, and are thus regression networks to which
many standard defenses for classifier networks cannot be applied.
In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first defense against adversarial attacks on
object detectors. To avoid the difficulties discussed above, we treat the complex detection pipeline as
a black box without requiring specialized re-training schemes. In particular, we present a reduction
from object detection to a single regression problem which envelopes the proposal, classification, and
non-maximum suppression stages of the detection pipeline. Then, we endow this regression with
certified robustness using the Gaussian smoothing approach [3], originally proposed for the defense
of classifiers. To this end, we develop a new variant of smoothing specifically for regressions based
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: Samples of object detection certificates using the proposed method. Dotted lines represent
the farthest a bounding box could move under an adversarial perturbation δ of bounded `2-norm. If
the predicted bounding box can be made to disappear, or if the label can be made to change, after a
perturbation with ‖δ‖2 < 0.36, then we annotate the bounding box with a red X.
on the medians of the smoothed predictions, rather than their mean values. The proposed median
smoothing approach enjoys a number of useful properties, and we expect it to find further applications
in certified robustness. Finally, we implement our method to obtain a certifiably-robust wrapper of
the YOLOv3 object detector [22]. We use the MS-COCO dataset [15] to test the resulting detector,
achieving 28.86% certified precision and 9.10% certified recall under adversarial perturbations with
`2-norm less than 0.36.
2 Background
We briefly review attacks on object detectors, and the certified classification methods we build upon.
Attacks on object detection and semantic segmentation. Attacks exist that interfere with different
components of the detection pipeline. Dense Adversary Generation (DAG) is an early attack that
interferes with the classifier stage of detection [31], and was later extended to videos [28]. In contrast,
region proposal networks can be manipulated by decreasing the confidence of proposals [12]. The
DPatch attack causes misclassification by placing a patch that does not overlap with the objects of
interest [17], while the attack in [13] contaminated images with “imperceptible” patches.
The attacks described above are all digital. Early physical-world attacks on detectors fooled stop sign
detectors by modifying the entire stop sign [4, 2]. While it was shown that detectors are much more
robust to attacks than classifiers [23], later works successfully broke detectors using patch attacks
that do not require whole-object modification. This includes printed adversarial patches that deceive
person detectors [27], and adversarial clothing that makes its wearer invisible to a range of detection
systems [30].
In this paper, we present a certified defense for object detectors that is robust regardless of the method
used to craft the attack. Our work is motivated by recent progress on certified image classification by
the randomized smoothing approach, as we review next.
2
Certified defenses for image classification. Various methods of obtaining robustness certificates
for classification problems have been proposed [3, 7, 19, 29, 21]. For our purposes, we focus on
randomized smoothing defenses. These first convert a base classifier to a smoothed classifier by
labeling many images sampled from a Gaussian ball around the input, and taking a majority vote
[3]. The effect of image perturbations on this smoothed classifier can be bounded using either the
Neyman-Pearson Lemma [3] or properties of the Weierstrass transform [24].
Since [9] proposed randomized smoothing for robustness, it has been improved by tightening the
certificate [3], improving the training process [24], or adapting it to new threat models [11] – all in
the context of classification tasks. In particular, the voting scheme in [3] requires a global bound on
the output of the base classifier [24], which naturally holds for binary classifiers with a 0/1 output.
We will see later that existing certificates based on randomized smoothing become weaker when
applied to regression problems over a large range of output values. Towards the intended application
of robust detection, we propose a new certificate for regression problems based on the median of the
smoothed predictions, rather than their mean values, which is of independent interest.
3 Detection Certificates
In this section, we introduce the proposed certificate in the context of modern detection pipelines. We
begin by describing the black box interface that allows us to certify the outputs of detector networks
without the need for re-training. Then, we motivate and define the proposed certificate at a high level,
where the next two sections fill in the details.
Detection interface. Typical object detectors take an input image and output a variable-length
list of bounding boxes and associated class labels {(b1, `1), (b2, `2), . . . }. State-of-the-art detectors,
such as Faster-RCNN [23], YOLO [22], and RetinaNet [16] usually have many output heads, each
of which is responsible for a single bounding box. As the number of output heads is usually much
larger than the number of objects, redundant boxes need to be filtered out, e.g., by Non-Maximum
Suppression (NMS). First, NMS discards any box with an objectness score below a threshold τ . Then,
the box b∗ with the highest score is taken out as output, and any remaining boxes overlapping b∗
significantly are filtered out. This process is repeated until there are no more boxes left.
Certifying detector outputs. Adversarial attacks on object detectors attempt to distort the location
and appearance of objects. We certify detector outputs by bounding the positions and sizes of the
detected objects. In addition, we ensure that the associated class labels stay the same.
Representation. We represent a bounding box b using the coordinates of its corners (x1, y1, x2, y2),
with x1 ≤ x2 and y1 ≤ y2, along with the associated class label ` and objectness score. Then, to
measure the overlap between two boxes b1 and b2, we use the Intersection over Union defined as
IoU(b1, b2) = Area(b1 ∩ b2)/Area(b1 ∪ b2).
Bounding-box certificate. Given a predicted bounding box b, we aim to certify its size and location.
Assume for now that we obtained certified lower and upper bound for each coordinate of b as
(x1, y1, x2, y2) and (x1, y1, x2, y2). We say that a box is “certifiably correct” if the IoU between
the ground truth bounding box and the worst-case bounding box, with coordinates respecting the
certified bounds, is above a certain threshold. If x2 ≤ x1 or y2 ≤ y1, then the worst-case IoU is
zero. Otherwise, the worst-case bounding box can always be found in the set {x1, x1} × {y1, y1} ×{x2, x2} × {y2, y2}. Hence, we simply enumerate all 16 boxes, and take the smallest IoU. As long
as the worst-case IoU is larger than the threshold τ , then the box b is considered certifiably correct.
Label certificates. We treat the label ` ∈ N as an additional coordinate. Again, assuming we
obtained certified lower and upper bounds as ` and `, then ` is only considered certified when ` = `.
In the next section, we describe the smoothing approach we use to obtain the required certified bounds
on each coordinate.
3
4 Median Smoothing for Regression
A number of strategies have been proposed for certifying classifiers, many based on Gaussian means.
We will see below that the bounds provided become fairly weak for regression problems. For this
reason, we propose smoothing based on Gaussian medians, which provide considerably stronger
bounds for regression networks such as object detectors.
Mean smoothing. Given a base function f : Rd −→ R, its Gaussian smoothed analog is [3, 9, 24]
g(x) = E[f(x+G)], where G ∼ N(0, σ2I). (1)
In the context of classifier networks, where output heads take the form f : Rd → [0, 1], a certificate
can be obtained by bounding the gap between the highest and second-highest class probabilities
[3]. However, we aim to apply the smoothing technique to a general regression problem, such as
bounding box regression, with f : Rd → [l, u]. In that case, the bound on g can be rather loose,
which follows by invoking Lemma 2 from [24] (see their appendix) with the normalized function
f(x)−l
u−l as stated below; see Appendix A for further discussion. Throughout, we use Φ to denote the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard Guassian distribution.
Corollary 1. [24] For any f : Rd −→ [l, u], the map η(x) = σ ·Φ−1( g(x)−lu−l ) is 1-Lipschitz, implying
l + (u− l) · Φ
(
η(x)− ‖δ‖2
σ
)
≤ g(x+ δ) ≤ l + (u− l) · Φ
(
η(x) + ‖δ‖2
σ
)
(2)
Median smoothing. The issue with Gaussian smoothing is that the mean values it computes can be
highly skewed by extreme values of the base function. Hence, the resulting bounds are rather loose
when applied to functions with large variations in their outputs. This is not a problem for classifiers
(which output values between 0 and 1), but is highly problematic for general regression problems.
To obtain tighter certificates, we utilize the percentiles of the output random variable instead of
its mean. In particular, as the median is almost unaffected by outliers, a global bound on the base
function is no longer required. Formally, we propose the following formulation.
Definition 1. Given f : Rd −→ R and G ∼ N(0, σ2I), we define the percentile smoothing of f as
hp(x) = sup{y ∈ R | P[f(x+G) ≤ y] ≤ p} (3)
hp(x) = inf{y ∈ R | P[f(x+G) ≤ y] ≥ p} (4)
While the two forms hp and hp are equivalent for continuous distributions, the distinction is needed
to handle edge cases with discrete distributions. In the remainder of the paper, we will use hp to
denote the percentile-smoothed function when either definition can be applied. While hp may not
admit a closed form, we can approximate it by Monte Carlo sampling [3], as we explain in Section 5.
A useful property of percentile smoothing is that it always outputs a realizable output of the base
function f . This can be useful when f produces discrete values or labels (as is the case for classifiers),
or bounding boxes. In contrast, mean smoothing is a weighted average of the outputs, and it is more
susceptible to outliers. For example, when two distinct bounding boxes are predicted, we select one
or the other rather than their average.
Regression certificates. To certify a percentile-smoothed function hp for input x under adversarial
perturbations of bounded `2-norm, we evaluate the function at x with two appropriate percentiles
p and p. The basic idea is to first bound the probability that the output of the base function f
will fall below a particular threshold Λ. A key observation is that this is equivalent to bounding a
mean-smoothed indicator function E(1f(x+G)<Λ), which satisfies the assumption of Corollary 2. We
can then use this bound to further bound the change in the percentiles output by hp; see Appendix B
for the full proof.
Lemma 1. A percentile-smoothed function hp with adversarial perturbation δ can be bounded as
hp(x) ≤ hp(x+ δ) ≤ hp(x) ∀ ‖δ‖2 < , (5)
where p := Φ
(
Φ−1(p)− σ
)
and p := Φ
(
Φ−1(p) + σ
)
, with Φ being the standard Gaussian CDF.
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The immediate benefit of hp is that the tightness of the bound now depends on the concentration of f
around the p-th percentile of f(x+G), per the local gap between the percentiles hp(x) and hp(x).
In contrast, the bound obtained by g depends on the position of E[f(x+G)] relative to the global
bounds per the extreme values l and u.
In addition, percentile smoothing can be applied without specifying the bounds l and u, which
may be unknown a priori. Even when one or both of the bounds l and u is infinite, percentile
smoothing provides a non-vacuous certificate where mean smoothing fails. For example, take f so
that f(x+G) ∼ N(0, 1). In this case, it is easy to see that the bounds on g(x+ δ) per Corollary 2
are vacuous, while h50%(x+ δ) can be bounded between ±‖δ‖2/σ by Lemma 2.
Now that we have a mechanism for bounding the individual coordinates output by an object detector,
we proceed to describe the specifics of our approach and its implementation.
5 Implementing Detection Certificates
In order to certify the predictions output by the object detector, we aggregate multiple predictions
made under randomly perturbed inputs using the median smoothing approach presented in Section 4.
Roughly speaking, the more the aggregated predictions agree, the stronger the certificate.
Recall that each prediction consists of four coordinates (x1, y1, x2, y2) representing a bounding box,
with the associated label ` ∈ N treated as the fifth coordinate. As outlined in Section 3, the proposed
certificate requires lower and upper bounds for each coordinate of each prediction.
Our certification strategy is based on treating each coordinate c as the output of a dedicated function
fc. Then, we apply median smoothing to certify each coordinate independently. The challenge to
implementing this strategy is to consolidate multiple predictions, each with five coordinates, as a
single vector so that certified regression can be applied. The main complication is that object detectors
typically produce a variable-length list of predictions in no particular order. In contrast, our regression
model requires a single vector with a consistent assignment of indices to prediction coordinates.
Certification pipeline. First, we compose a base detector b into a sequence f = r ◦ b ◦ d, where
r encodes the predictions produced by b into one or more vectors, and d is a denoiser to improve
concentration. Then, we work with the median smoothing of f , see Definition 1, and use Monte Carlo
sampling to approximate hp(x) along with lower and upper bounds. See Figure 2 for the overall
workflow and Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode.
Monte Carlo Sampling
Denoise Black Box Detector
Detection as 
RegressionImage Add Noise
Detection
Robust
Certificate
Figure 2: Converting a base detector to a certified robust detector.
Denoising. The denoiser d is applied to the input of the base detector b. The idea is that, since
the Gaussian smoothing certificate can be applied to any pipeline, we might as well apply it to one
that begins with a denoiser that removes most of the Gaussian noise. This makes f(x + G) more
concentrated [25], resulting in a stronger certificate without re-training on noisy data.
Encoding detectors as regressors. Given n detections of potential objects, the corresponding
predictions can be represented as u ∈ Rn×5, where n may vary across random perturbations. We
aim to convert u into a suitable vector v = r(u). A naive approach to implement the encoding r
is to simply copy u into v before possibly padding v with sentinel entries up to the desired length.
However, even if the detector produces the same predictions under different noises, their ordering
may be different leading to inconsistencies that weaken the certificate.
To improve the consistency of the encoded regression vectors, we propose two operations. The first
operation is based on sorting the predictions in u either by their objectness scores or by the centers of
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Naive Padding Sorting Sorting+Binning
Prediction 1
Padded
prediction 2
Padded
prediction 1
Prediction 2
Figure 3: Even when the bounding boxes predicted for one image appear among the predictions for
another noisy sample, the outputs will appear completely different if the boxes are not ordered in the
same way. In the first column, we convert the detected output into a fixed length vector by directly
padding the output, and none of the boxes are aligned. In the second column, we sort the boxes by
location first before padding, allowing us to align one box out of three. In the third column, we place
the boxes into corresponding bins before sorting, and this approach aligns all three boxes as desired.
their bounding boxes.1 The second operation is based on partitioning u into independent bins based
on the labels or the locations2 of the predictions, with each bin bi encoded separately as a vector
vi. Detecting a different number of objects in some bin does not affect the other bins; see Figure 3.
For example, when binning by label, a dog which is only detected under some perturbations would
not impact the certificates produced for any cars; see Figure 1. As the random perturbations may
produce vectors of varying lengths, we implicitly assume that all vectors are padded with sentinel
values, taken as∞, such that every coordinate has a corresponding realization in all outputs.
Algorithm 1 Prediction and Certified Detection
function DETECT(f , x, σ, n)
xˆ← AddGaussianNoise(x, σ, n) . xˆ is n times as large as x
yˆ ← toRegression(f(xˆ) ) . Convert detection output into regression vectors
yˆ ← Sort(yˆ) . Sort each coordinates along the batch dimension
ymedian ← yˆb0.5nc . Take the median
bbox, `← toDetection(ymedian)
return bbox, `
function CERTIFYDETECT(f , x, σ, n, , c)
qu, ql ← GetEmpiricalPerc(n, , c)
xˆ← AddGaussianNoise(x, σ, n) . xˆ is n times as large as x
yˆ ← toRegression(f(xˆ) )
yˆ ← Sort(yˆ) . Sort each coordinates along the batch dimension
ymedian ← yˆb0.5nc . Take the median
yu, yl ← yˆqu , yˆql . Take the qth order statistics
bbox, `, bbox, `, bbox, `← toDetection(ymedian, yu, yl)
return bbox, `, bbox, `, bbox, `
Evaluation of hp (GetEmpiricalPerc). In practice, we resort to using Monte Carlo sampling
to approximate the upper bound of hp(x) and lower bound of hp(x) similar to [3]. Given n draws
{G1, G2, . . . , Gn}, we evaluate Xi = f(x + Gi) ∈ R. Then, we find the corresponding order
statistics 0 = K0 ≤ K1 ≤ K2 · · · ≤ Kn ≤ Kn+1 =∞. We want to find the empirical order statistic
Kqu and Kql , such that P (Kqu ≥ hp) ≥ α and P (Kql ≤ hp) ≥ α. Specifically, given an order
statistic Kqu , we can evaluate P (Kqu ≥ hp) explicitly using the binomial formula below.
P (hp ≤ Kqu) =
i=qu∑
i=1
P (Ki−1 < hp ≤ Ki) =
j=qu∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(p)i(1− p)n−i (6)
1When sorting by centers, we first sort vertically then horizontally. We found that this is important in
achieving better results as in the object detection task, the horizontal location of a detected object seems to be
more informative than the vertical location.
2For location binning, we split the image into 3x3 grid cells, and gather the corresponding boxes into bins
based on the center of the box.
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A similar formula can be derived for P (hp ≥ Kql). We can then use binary search to find the smallest
qu and largest ql such that P (hp ≤ Kqu) ≥ α and P (hp ≥ Kql) ≥ α are satisfied.
Robustness metrics and performance evaluation. To evaluate the robustness of the smoothed
object detector, we use the certified precision and recall calculated as follows. To get the number
of certifiably correct boxes, we count the number of detections whose worst-case IoU with the
corresponding ground-truth box exceeds the threshold τ . To calculate the certified precision, we also
need to know the maximum possible number of detections under any perturbed input. We upper
bound this number by counting all certifiably non-empty entries across all regression vectors.
Certified Recall =
# certifiably correct detections
# ground-truth detections
(7)
Certified Precision =
# certifiably correct detections
max # predicted detections
(8)
6 Experiments
We use YOLOv3 [22], pretrained on the MS-COCO dataset [15], as our black-box detector where the
objectness and IoU thresholds for NMS are set to 0.8 and 0.4, respectively. The evaluation is done on
the first 500 images of the test set, out of 5000 total, with adversarial perturbations ‖δ‖2 <  = 0.36.
We set the IoU threshold for certification τ = 0.5, as it is a common setting for evaluation on the
MS-COCO dataset [15]. To perform the smoothing, we inject Gaussian noise with standard deviation
σ = 0.25. The estimated upper and lower bound for each coordinate are selected such that they
bound the true hp(x) and hp(x) with confidence α = 99.999%. For denoising, we use the DNCNN
denoiser [32] pretrained by [25] (with σ = 0.25).
We find all three approaches – sorting, binning, and denoising – are helpful in increasing the certified
precision and recall of the smoothed detector. All of these methods complement each other for the
most part, and we are able to achieve the most robust object detector by using all three methods.
Specifically, we find that sorting by box location works best, and that prepending a denoiser is indeed
very important for both the clean and certified precision and recall.
Sorting and binning methods. We find that sorting bounding boxes by location consistently
performs better than sorting them by objectness score, as shown in Table 1. The only scenario where
objectness sorting beats location sorting is when we use only location information for binning – we
speculate that using independent criteria for both sorting and binning results in a more informed
alignment of boxes.
Both label binning and location binning also consistently boost the certified precision/recall. Com-
pared to no binning, label binning alone could increase the precision by 5%, as shown in Table 1.
Furthermore, the two binning methods complement each other, and we are able to achieve the best
certified precision/recall by combining both location binning and label binning.
Sorting
Method
Binning
Method Precision Recall
Certified
Precision
Certified
Recall
Blackbox Detector 88.26% 38.28% - -
Objectness None 80.34% 15.08% 22.39% 6.01%
Location None 84.33% 15.75% 25.30% 6.78%
Objectness Label 85.66% 15.78% 25.63% 7.48%
Location Label 88.60% 16.32% 29.98% 8.81%
Objectness Location 86.57% 16.00% 27.81% 8.18%
Location Location 87.59% 16.16% 27.25% 7.99%
Objectness Location+Label 89.73% 16.13% 27.87% 8.81%
Location Location+Label 89.08% 16.10% 28.86% 9.10%
Table 1: Certified precision/recall using various sorting and binning methods.
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Denoising. Because we do not retrain the detector under noise, denoising the image first is extremely
important in achieving good certified precision/recall. In Table 2, we present performance with and
without the denoiser – given the results in Table 1 as summarized above, we restrict experiments to
the location sorting method. Without the denoiser, the certified precision/recall drops by an average
of 13.44%.
Binning
Method Denoise Precision Recall
Certified
Precision
Certified
Recall
None Yes 84.33% 15.75% 25.30% 6.78%
None No 54.94% 9.74% 9.03% 2.83%
Label Yes 88.60% 16.32% 29.98% 8.81%
Label No 63.49% 10.18% 10.40% 4.01%
Location Yes 87.59% 16.16% 27.25% 7.99%
Location No 61.64% 10.28% 10.98% 3.98%
Location+Label Yes 89.08% 16.10% 28.86% 9.10%
Location+Label No 66.25% 10.18% 10.56% 4.49%
Table 2: Denoising significantly improves the certified precision/recall. Sorting method: location.
Precision and recall. The precision of the base detector does not drop much after smoothing. In
certain cases, the clean precision is even increased slightly compared to the black-box detector; see
Table 1. In contrast, the recall is harmed significantly after smoothing, dropping from 38.28% to
16.32%. As a way to mitigate this shortcoming, we consider the effect of reducing the objectness
threshold of the black-box detector, as shown in Table 3. In general, allowing the black-box detector
to output boxes with a lower objectness threshold allows us to trade off precision for improved recall
for the certified detector.
While the certified precision/recall are still far below the requirements of real-world applications, the
proposed smoothing approach is able to certify over two thirds of the predicted boxes without any
re-training of the base detector.
Objectness
Threshold Precision Recall
Certified
Precision
Certified
Recall
0.8 89.08% 16.10% 28.86% 9.10%
0.6 85.37% 19.12% 25.82% 10.98%
0.4 80.36% 21.48% 20.72% 11.68%
0.2 71.20% 25.01% 15.49% 12.57%
Table 3: Trading-off the certified precision/recall of the smoothed detector by changing the objectness
threshold of the black-box detector. Here we used location sorting with location and label binning.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a new type of randomized smoothing using a percentile instead of an expectation, such
that certificates can be easily generated for regression-type problems. We then apply it to obtain the
first certified defense for object detectors. Some potential future work includes decreasing the sample
complexity of our randomized certificate, extending our robust detector to defend against other threat
models like patch attacks leveraging the method from [11], or using a learning approach to find a
better reduction from detection to regression compared to our binning/sorting approach. We note that
the machinery we have developed for certifying regression problems is largely application agnostic,
and we hope it can find use in certifying a range of other regression tasks.
8
Broader Impact
Neural networks are very powerful tools, and society will benefit greatly if they can be used in a
broader range of safety critical applications. In particular, object detectors can be used in many
systems that must visually perceive and interact with the real world – perhaps most strikingly, in
autonomous vehicles. Ensuring the safety and predictability of neural networks is critical in enabling
the application of neural networks in these areas, and certificates associated with safety with respect to
a particular model are very useful in providing assurance that the neural network cannot be exploited
by malicious actors. At the same time, there is real concern about the privacy impact of widespread
deployment of modern computer vision systems, including systems like object detectors and face
recognition systems that produce bounding boxes. If individuals wish to use physical or digital
adversarial examples to protect their privacy, the techniques we present might make it more difficult
for them to do so, although it is not actually clear that adversarial examples will ultimately prove
effective or useful for protecting privacy. In any case, we are not aware of any real-world adversarial
attacks being performed “in the wild”, for good or ill. We believe the concrete positive impact on
safety is probably greater than a hypothetical negative impact on privacy.
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A Weaknesses of Mean Smoothing
In contrast to classification networks, where each output head encodes a function f : R −→ [0, 1], the
output of regression networks may vary over a larger range of values, e.g., between some lower and
upper bounds l and u. If we directly apply the same techniques for certifying classification output,
based on bounding the gap between the highest and second-highest class probabilities, the resulting
bounds on regression can be rather loose. To better articulate this claim, we derived the following
result following the work in [24], as we recall from the main paper.
Corollary 2. [24] For any f : Rd −→ [l, u], the map η(x) = σ ·Φ−1( g(x)−lu−l ) is 1-Lipschitz, implying
l + (u− l) · Φ
(
η(x)− ‖δ‖2
σ
)
≤ g(x+ δ) ≤ l + (u− l) · Φ
(
η(x) + ‖δ‖2
σ
)
(9)
In light of the statement above, we make the following remarks.
Location dependence. Since Φ−1 is flatter around 0.5 and steeper as it gets closer to 0 or 1, the
non-linear Lipschitz bound in Corollary 2 is tightest when g(x) is closer to u or l and loosest when
g(x) = u−l2 . In the context of bounding-box regression, the coordinate-wise bound for the bounding
box would be tighter when the sides of the bounding box are closer to the edges of the image, but
looser when the sides are closer to the middle of the image. This strong bias in the tightness of the
bound depending on the location of the box weakens the resulting worst-case bounds and makes the
system more vulnerable to attacks targeting the middle portion of the output range.
Skewness. The mean-smoothed certificate is less sensitive to the shape of the distribution of
f(x + G). Intuitively, we would hope that the bound should be tighter for a more concentrated
distribution compared to one that is more uniform. For example, the distribution could be significantly
concentrated around a certain value in the support, but the mean-smoothed certificate only uses the
expectation E[f(x+G)], which can be skewed by long tails and outliers.
Figure 4: Smoothing two functions with G ∼ N(0, 0.52): discrete (top) and continuous (bottom).
Blurring. When the base function f outputs discrete values, its median smoothing will also stay
discrete, whereas mean smoothing would be continuous; see the first row of Figure 4. Moreover, when
the base function is continuous, median smoothing tends to be more similar to the original function;
see the second row of Figure 4 where mean-smoothed outputs are attracted to 1, e.g., overestimating
f(2) and underestimating f(3) in contrast to median smoothing which is more concentrated in the
neighborhood of each input.
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B Proof of Lemma 2 - Adversarial Bounds for Percentile Smoothing
Recall the definition of percentile smoothing as follows. Given a base function f : Rd −→ R, with
G ∼ N(0, σ2I), we defined the percentile smoothing of f as
hp(x) = sup{y ∈ R | P[f(x+G) ≤ y] ≤ p} (10)
hp(x) = inf{y ∈ R | P[f(x+G) ≤ y] ≥ p} (11)
where we use hp for convenience when the distinction is irrelevant.
In this appendix, we derive a bound on the variation in the percentile-smoothed function hp when the
input is corrupted by an adversarial perturbation δ of bounded `2-norm. We do so by proving the
following statement, which we recall from the main paper.
Lemma 2. A percentile-smoothed function hp with adversarial perturbation δ can be bounded as
hp(x) ≤ hp(x+ δ) ≤ hp(x) ∀ ‖δ‖2 < , (12)
where p := Φ
(
Φ−1(p)− σ
)
and p := Φ
(
Φ−1(p) + σ
)
, with Φ being the standard Gaussian CDF.
Proof. Consider the event f(x + G) ≤ hp(x), where G ∼ N(0, σ2I), and let 1f(x+G)≤hp(x) be
the corresponding indicator function. We can treat the expectation of the indicator as a function of
x, which we denote by E(x) = E[1f(x+G)≤hp(x)], and we have that E : Rd → [0, 1]. Hence, the
mapping x 7→ σ · Φ−1(E(x)) is 1-Lipschitz by Corollary 2 [24]. Noting that E(x) = P[f(x+G) ≤
hp(x)], we also have that
x 7→ σ · Φ−1(P[f(x+G) ≤ hp(x)])
is 1-Lipschitz. It follows that under the perturbation by δ, we have
σ · Φ−1(P[f(x+ δ +G) ≤ hp(x)]) ≥ σ · Φ−1(P[f(x+G) ≤ hp(x)])− ‖δ‖2.
Rearranging, we get that
Φ−1(P[f(x+ δ +G) ≤ hp(x)]) ≥ Φ−1(P[f(x+G) ≤ hp(x)])− ‖δ‖2
σ
≥ Φ−1(P[f(x+G) ≤ hp(x)])− 
σ
(‖δ‖2 ≤ )
= Φ−1(p)− 
σ
(
By the definition of hp(x)
)
= Φ−1(p) (By the definition of p)
By the monotonicity of Φ, we get that
P[f(x+ δ +G) ≤ hp(x)] ≥ p
Recalling that hp(x+ δ) = inf{y ∈ R | P[f(x+ δ +G) ≤ y] ≥ p}, we get that
hp(x+ δ) ≤ hp(x). (13)
Similarly, it can be shown that for all ‖δ‖2 < , we have
hp(x) ≤ hp(x+ δ). (14)
Combining the two bounds, and recalling the convenience notation of hp, the proof follows.
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C Certified Precision and Recall for Varying `2-Norm Bounds
To examine how the performance of our certified detector degrades as the adversary becomes stronger,
we consider perturbations for larger values of . As in the experiments reported in the main paper, we
use the first 500 images of the MS-COCO dataset for testing on a pretrained YOLOv3 detector with
an objectness threshold of 0.8 and an IoU threshold of 0.4. As in the main paper, we used an IoU
threshold τ = 0.5 for certification.
Table 4 below shows the certified precision and recall for ‖δ‖2 ≤ , for varying values of  compared
to the setting  = 0.36 we used in the main paper. For the purposes of this comparison, we used
location sorting with location and label binning. Note that the non-certified clean precision and recall
obtained for this setup are 89.30% and 16.07%, respectively.
 Certified Precision Certified Recall
0.10 63.13% 13.46%
0.25 41.39% 10.79%
0.36 28.86% 9.10%
0.50 15.82% 6.78%
Table 4: Certified precision and recall for different bounds on the perturbation ‖δ‖2 ≤ .
Note that the certified precision drops much faster because the maximum number of possible
predictions increases quite quickly as  becomes larger.
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